Cybersecurity Essay: 1971: How India's RAW Quietly Liberated Bangladesh

Mar 18, 2024

12 min read

Note:

Written in early 2024 for GPGN 490 — an intelligence and cybersecurity course — during my second year of graduate studies in International Affairs. The paper analyzes RAW's covert campaign that helped facilitate Bangladesh's independence: the training of the Mukti Bahini, Operation Jackpot, the PSYWAR division, and the meticulous geopolitical maneuvering that turned a genocide into a justified overt intervention. The section I am most invested in is the one on mythology — how India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh each remember 1971 differently, and what those differences reveal about identity, defeat, and the ownership of history.

A note: I am not a historian or regional specialist — this is graduate coursework, rigorously researched but necessarily limited in scope. There is far more to say about 1971 than any single paper can hold, and I welcome correction and conversation.

1971: India, RAW, and the Liberation of Bangladesh

History & Context

The 1971 Bangladesh independence movement stemmed from many factors such as sheer distance between East and West Pakistan, compounded with differences in language and culture led to unsurmountable tension. Additionally, the West Pakistan government’s “Urdu-only” language policy attended to join the regions simply on the basis of religion, but the institutionalized banning of the Bangla language ostracized and enraged already economically challenged people living in East Pakistan^,. As activists and students demanded language and cultural recognition, the Pakistani police imposed martial law and brutally cracked down on gatherings. Compounded by a devastating cyclone and nonrecognition of East Pakistan’s political elections, a civil disobedience movement began.

The truly horrific turn occurred with Pakistan’s 1971 Operation Searchlight, aimed to dispel the movement, which led military forces to torture and kill over 7000 unarmed civilians essentially overnight. This genocidal campaign still has not been fully recognized by the United Nations. While this can be analyzed in its own right, India’s intervention - occurred in a cleverly secretive manner -- set the stage for them to officially intervene in the war. India’s Research and Analysis Wing's support of the Bengali nationalist movement helped facilitate independence; a clear example of intelligence’s ability to shape geopolitics -- both covertly and overtly.

Operational Environment

As early as 1969, Rameshwar Nath Kao, the founder chief of RAW, was able to detect the high risk of turmoil in the region. As written by author Zorawar Daulet Singh, Kao foresaw that the necessity to involve the army to curb revolt would circularly lead to an increase in secessionist sympathies, and that they

“may rise in revolt against the Central Authority and even declare their independence … although this possibility may not be immediate at present, it would be desirable that the Government of India should think about the policy it should adopt in such an eventuality and keep its options open."

By the time that the official 1971 revolt occurred, RAW, still just 2.5 years old and developing its own footing, had already begun preparing for covert intervention. The reason for a discrete method was the broader geopolitical context of the Cold War. India had allied with the Soviet Union, and Pakistan with the United States -- the violent campaign was done with the “knowledge and support of the Nixon administration”. Nixon and Kissinger’s willing ignorance of the genocide stemmed from a dislike of South Asia and a prioritization of their Cold War worries -- creating a strong obstacle for any liberation support. Any outward actions on India’s part would have brought down a much larger geopolitical war. As such, RAW had to find a way to instigate Pakistan into creating a situation for justified overt action.

Specific threat actor: RAW

Broad History of RAW

The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was created to focus on China and Pakistan, and impact India’s influence abroad. It has contributed to several policies, such as Sikkim’s accession to India in 1975, secure development of the nuclear program, and even Apartheid movements during the Cold War. It was in Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, that RAW had some of the greatest impact. It served several purposes; providing intelligence to the army and policymakers and training the separatist Mukti Bahini group. While later operations, such as supporting the Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers, brought criticism, RAW has worked to improve its skill and security as well as image. This has broadened and refined to monitoring political and military developments that directly affect national security as well as operations that control the military supply to Pakistan, which remains India’s greatest adjacent threat.

RAW in 1971

India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) - focused internally -- was unable to detect important external build up during the 1962 war with China. As a result of its inherited capabilities from IB, RAW’s innate organic capacity upon formation in 1968 was thus not up to par with other agencies in the West. As such, RN Kao’s immediate focus for the 2.5 years before the Bangladesh Liberation War, was on intelligence gathering for covert action in East Pakistan. It managed to create an extremely effective covert capability, such that it went into action the second Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to aid East Pakistan. Even so, it needed external resources to achieve success -- and did so through the use of the Mukti Bahini, or the Bangladeshi independence movement. An estimated 100,000 were trained by RAW from early in 1971 up until the start of the war. Additionally, strategic relationships with Tibetan forces maintained a campaign of sabotage against West Pakistan -- although Operation Eagle, as it was called, has no official records^,. Even so, it is known that these forces struck vital bridges and harassed Pakistan’s 97 Independent Brigade and crack 2 Commando Battalion to maintain pressure in the Chuttagong Hill Tracts, decreasing their morale without directly linking back to Indian military forces.

Target Strengths

Although Pakistan was seemingly cavalier about the war, it had several strengths that needed to be circumvented effectively. One was brute force, and the willingness to conduct genocidal operations such as Searchlight. This increased the risk of any actions taken towards liberation -- but nationalism and sheer determination to secede dispelled the fear of brutality. Pakistan also had the advantage of military preparedness; RAW had to navigate existing bases and naval ports, as well as weaponry provided by their international allies. The landscape of East Pakistan was also not easily navigable, especially since the weather was not permissible when PM Indira Gandhi originally wanted to join the war -- immediately after Bangladesh declared liberation plans. General Sam Manekshaw recounted that, in a closed meeting with leadership, he said joining the war immediately meant defeat;

“I have only 30 tanks and two armored divisions with me. The Himalayan passes will be opening anytime…The rains will start now in East Pakistan. When it rains there, the rivers become oceans. I guarantee 100 per cent defeat.”

Additionally, Pakistan had international support from allies such as the US and China. This legitimized actions taken and was a clear deterrent for other countries to get involved in actions that should (and were) condemned internationally. Of course, the Nixon administration supported Pakistan thoroughly and colluded with Yahya Khan to destabilize India as an additional deterrent to action; thus began the Sikh separatist movement that morphed into Khalistani sentiment^,.

Target Exploitation

Given that a direct approach was not feasible, as Pakistan had the support of the United States and the West, RAW had to covertly exploit logistical weaknesses in the military. One big target point was the mental laxness displayed by authorities; President Yahya Khan had “chosen to relax in the company of women” under the impression that no external force could stop his side from winning the war. Any overt action would have been seen as state-breaking or trigger the Cold War, and as such he did not pay heed to the possibility of months of covert operations.

The military had also become centralized to allow Yahya Khan direct operational control; this then reduced communication between the various sections of the army^,. Telephone use was careless, without the use of scrambling devices -- Indira Gandhi and others engaged in the RAW operations had daily access to conversations and orders.

The third exploitable weakness was the mentality of the people in East Pakistan; co-operation with Indian intelligence was essential for their liberation^,,. This allowed for network building and the creation of infrastructure that supported Indian intervention when overt action would have been acceptable^,.

Operation Jackpot

A RAW & Military joint operation to provide operations, training, and equipment for Bengali liberation fighters, Operation Jackpot was created after meticulous consideration of geopolitics as well as a basic duty to stop the genocide in East Pakistan. This facet of the overall campaign conducted by RAW focused on providing training to Mukti Bahini. Mukti Bahini utilized the nationalist sympathies after Operation Searchlight and other attacks to move away from an undercover resistance to a full fighting front, with the aid of Bengali defectors from the West Pakistan army and other sympathizers. This allowed them to gain legitimacy from insurgence by supplementing it with training from RAW and the efforts of the Indian government to aid secret policy and statebuilding in anticipation of liberation. In an almost Clausewitzian manner, Pakistan’s brutality lent legitimacy to the very group they tried to quell, allowing them to take up arms and exist as a credible threat.

RAW and the military established several training camps by the India-East Pakistan border to instruct in guerrilla warfare and clandestine operations, allowing them to not only support the movement but also set up a situation in which the Pakistani army would encroach on Indian territory or engage in warfare^,. This could then provide India a legitimate reason to retaliate and officially enter the war without external actors retaliating immediately.

PSYWAR

Concurrent to these efforts, RAW created a Psychological Warfare Division (PSYWAR) to capitalize on information and shape international perceptions of the ongoing conflict. Without directly showing preference for one side or the other, they engaged with media professionals from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India’s Akashvani radio, and East Pakistan’s radio stations to emphasize the humanitarian crisis at hand. They highlighted the atrocities committed by the Pakistani military as well as the necessity of East Pakistan to have their own separate identity, given vast cultural differences. PSYWAR emphasized the relationship between clandestine operations and policy support, setting the stage for India’s strategic intervention on humanitarian grounds rather than land or political disputes.

Their 2 fold campaign -- secretly training and funding Mukti Bahini while working on PSYWAR, was carefully thought out instead of initial leanings toward entering the war directly. The setup was so smooth that by the time the Pakistani Air Force preemptively stuck Indian Air Force bases on December 3, 1971, there was no hesitation for India to begin their naval and ground offensives -- and the rest of the world could openly sympathize with this decision.

Mythology

The 1971 war is looked at in 3 different ways by the involved parties. Ignoring the western feigned ignorance and continual denial of involvement in the genocide, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh each have their own mythology surrounding the conflict. For Indians, the war is a source of absolute pride, as it was a marker of military competence -- especially after the debacle of the Indo-China war. It’s akin to folklore, and stories of courage still resonate and define Indian outlook on geopolitics.

Additionally, as India is a media and movie-driven society, several films and shows constantly release to talk about the events that occurred during that time. One recent example in 2023 was a movie titled Pippa, named after the Russian amphibious war tank PT-76, which looked at the events of the war from a biographical standpoint. It covered the logistics behind newfangled amphibian warfare, the communications and support from the Soviet Union, the training for the Mukti Bahini -- and briefly discussed defectors from the West Pakistani army and the intelligence they provided Indian personnel. Another film released, also in 2023, Sam Bahadur, focused on the life of General Sam Manekshaw, later India’s first Field Marshal; a significant portion of his contribution to Indian poli-military history occurred during the Bangladesh Liberation War. In 2018, a biographical film focused on RAW covert ops, Raazi, focused on the accounts of an agent who was married into a family of Pakistani military officers. She was then able to relay information leading up to the war in 1971. The war and RAW’s actions remain active and relevant in modern India’s memory; countless films detail the legendary bravery demonstrated by military, covert, and political actors.

On the other hand, Pakistan treats these events as a forgotten conflict. Regarded as a humiliating defeat, especially considering the degree of support it had, little acknowledgement of the military and atrocities is mentioned. Many call it the “Fall of Dhaka” or attempt to justify military action due to pre-1971 tensions and violence on both fronts. Moreover, a “never again” mentality was developed, leading to an increase in nuclear investment and military development; the narrative (from textbooks to media) overly blames India and Hindu populations without acknowledging policies that Pakistan enabled^,. In fact, the Army Museum in Lahore has a plaque that states,

“Listen Nadir, we have got the root cause of this problem, and that is the Hindu. The decision was taken to kill Hindus. If Hindus are finished then this problem will be solved forever.” – Colonel Nadir Ali, recounting a conversation with his superior

There’s a blatant ignorance, even as several testimonies and written documents depict the targeted killing of Hindus, faith-testing and eventual murder of Bengali Muslims, and general political and “religious chauvinism” of the time. The mythology has become warped as a result of the devastating loss; this is not to say that all Pakistanis believe this, but there has been an indoctrination of these concepts from the ground up.

Bangladesh, rightly, views it as their own liberation war, one of the rare moments of geopolitical community support. At the same time, tensions still linger, as there are large numbers of refugees. Some in India are concerned that the “refugees from Opar Bangla (the other side of Bengal) may permanently settle, putting a burden on already stretched resources and changing the demographics of the host states,” which raises concerns across the border due to ethnocultural solidarity as well as concerns over their displaced citizens. Additionally, history books often emphasize India’s role in the success, transforming it into the India-Pakistan War of 1971 rather than focusing on the triggering point of the Bangladeshi Liberation movement. Irrespective of pre-existing Indo-Pak tensions, Bangladesh’s role shouldn’t be overshadowed -- a source of displeasure for many.

Conclusion

The Liberation of Bangladesh was a pivotal moment in geopolitical history, especially given India’s rapid and effective covert campaign. RAW meticulously exploited West Pakistan’s weaknesses to support the Mukti Bahini and facilitate independence -- until Pakistan preemptively struck, providing a valid reason to enter the war. Operation Jackpot and PSYWAR undermined the international support Pakistan had, turning the narrative to one of human rights-related intervention. Post the conflict, Pakistan lost East Pakistan, faced international condemnation, and Bangladesh emerged as a new actor in regional dynamics.

At the same time, there are several consequences of this campaign and the overall war. US-supported separatist movements within India still play a role in political spheres and have continued to spiral into extremism, influencing negative Western media narratives. Additionally, the region as a whole has become heavily nuclearized, with neither side willing to resolve tensions. While RAW’s intelligence campaign played a crucial role and succeeded, the aftermath of 1971 still has lasting effects. At the same time, it demonstrates how intelligence agencies can shape events in real time, working both international perceptions and ground-level operations to achieve the intended goals.

Works Cited

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